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In neurology and psychiatry the detailed study of illusory own body perceptions has
suggested close links between bodily processing and self-consciousness. One such
illusory own body perception is heautoscopy where patients have the sensation of being
reduplicated and to exist at two or even more locations. In previous experiments, using
a video head-mounted display, self-location and self-identiﬁcation were manipulated by
applying conﬂicting visuo-tactile information.Yet the experienced singularity of the self was
not affected, i.e., participants did not experience having multiple bodies or selves. In two
experiments presented in this paper, we investigated self-location and self-identiﬁcation
while participants saw two virtual bodies (video-generated in study 1 and 3D computer
generated in study 2) that were stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their
own body. In both experiments, we report that self-identiﬁcation with two virtual bodies
was stronger during synchronous stroking. Furthermore, in the video generated setup with
synchronous stroking participants reported a greater feeling of having multiple bodies than
in the control conditions. In study 1, but not in study 2, we report that self-location –
measured by anterior posterior drift – was signiﬁcantly shifted towards the two bodies in
the synchronous condition only. Self-identiﬁcation with two bodies, the sensation of having
multiple bodies, and the changes in self-location show that the experienced singularity of
the self can be studied experimentally. We discuss our data with respect to ownership
for supernumerary hands and heautoscopy. We ﬁnally compare the effects of the video
and 3D computer generated head-mounted display technology and discuss the possible
beneﬁts of using either technology to induce changes in illusory self-identiﬁcation with a
virtual body.
Keywords: heautoscopy, full body illusion, virtual reality, ownership, self consciousness
INTRODUCTION
In neurology and psychiatry the detailed study of illusory own
body perceptions (Lhermitte, 1939; Hécaen and Ajuriaguerra,
1952; Critchley, 1953; Ionasescu, 1960) has suggested close links
between bodily processing and self-consciousness. Such illusions
include a variety of alterations in perceptual bodily experience
such as the experiences of the absence of a body part (Hécaen
and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Critchley, 1953; Frederiks, 1969), body
part transformations (Lhermitte, 1939; Hécaen and Ajuriaguerra,
1952; Lippman, 1952; Ionasescu, 1960), body part displacement
(Lippman, 1952; Nightingale, 1982), disconnection of one body
part from the body (Lippman, 1952; Blanke et al., 2003; Hey-
drich et al., 2010), the delusional misidentiﬁcation of one’s own
body part (i.e., somatoparaphrenia; Gerstmann, 1942; Vallar and
Ronchi, 2009), as well as phantom limbs (Lhermitte, 1939; Hécaen
andAjuriaguerra,1952; Brugger,2006), and supernumerary phan-
tom limbs (Vuilleumier et al., 1997; Khateb et al., 2009; for reviews,
see Blanke et al., 2008; Blanke, 2012). Dramatic forms of illusory
own body perceptions are autoscopic phenomena, such as the
out-of-body experience and the doppelganger experience (also
known as heautoscopy) of neurological origin (Brugger, 2002;
Blanke et al., 2004). During autoscopic phenomena patients not
only report altered perceptual bodily experience, but a break-
down of the spatial unity between the physical body and the
self (Brugger, 2002). Thus, patients suffering from an out-of-
body experience perceive the self and the world as if their self
was localized outside their physical bodily boundaries (abnormal
self-location and ﬁrst person perspective) and no longer identify
themselves with their physical body but with a spatial position
where the illusory autoscopic body is perceived (abnormal self-
identiﬁcation; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). While out-of-body
experiences are disturbing experiences, patients continue to expe-
rience the self as singular, that is, they experience only one self
that is abnormally localized, but at one single position and van-
tage point (Brugger, 2002). This is not the case in many patients
suffering from heautoscopy, where the self may be experienced as
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reduplicated – existing at two or even more locations simultane-
ously (for review, see Brugger et al., 2006). Thus, in heautoscopy
the self may be experienced at the location of the physical body,
at that of the autoscopic body, or self-location may be at both
locations at the same time (Brugger, 2002; Blanke et al., 2004;
Heydrich and Blanke, 2013).
Howcanwe study themechanismsof experienced singularity of
self-consciousness in healthy participants? Virtual and augmented
reality techniques have enabled scientists in recent years to study
many aspects of human behavior and multi-sensory integration.
Scientists have used virtual reality (VR) techniques to investigate
visual capture of the arm or the entire body (Slater et al., 2009;
Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Slater et al., 2010), and for a broad range
of research topics such as phobias [fear of public speaking (Slater
et al., 2006), heights (Usoh et al., 2003), tunnels (Mühlberger
et al., 2007), social interaction (Bailenson et al., 2003), proxemics
(Llobera et al., 2010), visual control of locomotion (Warren et al.,
2001; Mohler et al., 2007), and space perception (Thompson et al.,
2004; Mohler et al., 2010)]. Use of VR techniques has also enabled
scientists to carefully control stimuli that are otherwise difﬁcult or
even impossible to control in the real world.
Virtual reality can be used in combination with video technol-
ogy (often referred to as augmented reality) or can be used with
a 3D graphical rendering of a surrounding visual world. Different
research groups have recently developed experimental paradigms
to study several aspects of bodily self-consciousness – such as full
body ownership or self-identiﬁcation with the hand or body, as
well as self-location (i.e., the experience of where I am in space) –
by exposing participants tomultisensory conﬂicts of bodily stimuli
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al.,
2007; Ionta et al., 2011; Blanke, 2012; Aspell et al., 2013). Initiated
by seminalwork on illusory ownership for a fake hand (e.g., rubber
hand illusion, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Schmalzl and Ehrsson,
2011) more recent work has targeted illusory ownership for a vir-
tual body (e.g., the full body illusion, see below, Ehrsson, 2007;
Lenggenhager et al., 2007), a virtual face (Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza
et al., 2010) or a virtual voice (Zheng et al., 2011).
Thus, it has been found that during the full body illusion
participants self-identify with a virtual body and show drifts in
self-location towards the virtual body if their back is stroked
while they see their own virtual body on a head mounted dis-
play (HMD) being stroked in synchrony (Lenggenhager et al.,
2007, 2009; Ionta et al., 2011). These ﬁndings were strengthened
by Aspell et al. (2009), who showed that this experimental sce-
nario is associated with changes in visuo-tactile perception as
quantiﬁed by the crossmodal congruency effect (CCE). Despite
the importance of these studies for the understanding of self-
identiﬁcation and self-location, these experimental setups did
not alter the experienced singularity of the self, as they were
mostly inspired by studies of out-of-body experiences (Ehrsson,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). However, the related neurolog-
ical condition of heautoscopy is associated not just with altered
self-identiﬁcation and self-location, but frequently with a loss of
experienced singularity of the self leading to self-identiﬁcation
with two spatially distinct bodies and self-location at two dis-
tinct spatial locations (bi-location of the self; Lenggenhager et al.,
2007, 2009; Aspell et al., 2009). As this latter important aspect of
bodily self-consciousness has not been studied in earlier experi-
mental work, we here modiﬁed the full-body illusion based on a
recent experiment that induced illusory ownership for two fake
hands that are being stroked synchronously with the hidden hand
of the participant (Ehrsson, 2009; Guterstam et al., 2011). While
these rubber hand studies were able to demonstrate that super-
numerary extremities can be experienced as “mine,” as in the
clinical condition of supernumerary phantom limbs (13, 14),
we here investigated whether we could experimentally induce
self-identiﬁcation with more than one body.
Running two studies using two different techniques, e.g., video
(study 1) and computer generated graphics (study 2), also allowed
us to compare the two approaches. On the one hand, 3D computer
generated graphics enables the experimenter to control the repre-
sentation of participants. The experimenter can manipulate, for
example, body size (Yee and Bailenson, 2007), identity (Yee et al.,
2009), or the motion characteristics of the body (Ries et al., 2009).
Video, on the other hand, preserves the visual cues from the real
world, including the identity of the participants.
Moreover, in experiments investigating multi-sensory stimuli,
precise timing is likely important. Typically in video the delay
between the seen image in the HMD and what one would see
without wearing the HMD is low and well controlled, whereas in
3D computer generated graphics, this time additionally depends
on the tracked data and is typically between 25 and 60 ms. Thus,
it might be useful for the ﬁeld of VR to compare 3D com-
puter generated and video display of humanoid avatars according
to new criteria, oriented towards the subjective feeling of self-
identiﬁcation with and self-location towards a virtual body rather
than the usual criteria of visual realism.
To summarize, the present studies aimed to investigate whether
healthy participants may experience a breakdown of the expe-
rienced singularity between the body and the self as quantiﬁed
through self-identiﬁcation with more than one body in our
different VR setups. This allowed us to compare the two VR
techniques that are most widespread today (video-based VR and
computer generated-based VR) using the same paradigm. We
ﬁrst extended a previous setup (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) using
a video HMD (study 1) and investigated self-location and self-
identiﬁcation while participants saw two fake bodies that were
stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own
body.Wehypothesized that self-identiﬁcationwith two fake bodies
would be stronger during synchronous stroking and that self-
location would be signiﬁcantly shifted towards the two bodies
in the body synchronous (BS) condition only. Furthermore, we
hypothesized that synchronous stroking will be associated with
the breakdown of the singular self and the feeling of having mul-
tiple bodies. In a second follow-up study we adapted the set-up to
3D computer generated graphics in order to compare video with
computer generated technology (Study 2) using a between subject
design maintaining the same hypotheses as in study 1.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 19 healthy right-handed participants took part in
study 1 (11 males, mean age 24.7 years) and 17 healthy partic-
ipants took part in study 2 (9 males, mean age 27.8 years). All
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participants had no previous experience with the task or related
experimental paradigms. All participants had normal or corrected
to normal vision and had no history of neurological or psychiatric
conditions.
ETHICS STATEMENT
All participants gave written informed consent and were compen-
sated for their participation. The study protocol was approved by
the local ethics research committee – La Commission d’éthique de
la recherche Clinique de la Faculté de Biologie et de Médécine – at
the University of Lausanne, Switzerland (study 1) and the ethical
committee of the University of Tübingen (study 2), and was per-
formed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the
Declaration of Helsinki.
STUDY 1
Materials
Participants stood at a distance of 2 m and with their backs fac-
ing a video camera (JVC Victor GR-X5 3CCD, 30 degree ﬁeld of
view). Participants were either standing to the right or the left
of the camera (see Figure 1). The video image was cropped at
the midline and subsequently duplicated using a Sony DFS-300,
DME switcher (Sony Corp., Tokyo, Japan). The video was pro-
jected in real time (<16 ms, except for asynchronous blocks, see
below) onto a HMD (Virtual Viewer 3D, SVGA 80 × 600, 35
degree ﬁeld of view, Virtual Realities Inc.) enabling participants
to view their body once on the left and once on the right in a
split screen mode (body condition). White noise was presented
over headphones to mask any noise, and participants wore a cloth
hood over their heads to occlude vision of their surroundings.
The experiment took place under constant artiﬁcial illumination.
During “stroking blocks” the backs (the area spanning the shoul-
ders to waist) of participants were irregularly stroked, about once
every 2 s by the experimenter with a long wooden stick, and
participants viewed their body and the stroking via the HMD.
The blocks lasted about 2 min. In asynchronous blocks a camera
delay of 400 ms was introduced (DelayLine, Ovation Systems Ltd.,
London, UK). As a control condition a white upright rectangular
human-sized metal panel (object condition) was chosen. All stim-
ulus and procedural details were as described for the synchronous
and asynchronous blocks in the body condition, except that in
“synchronous object”blocks, participants’ backs were stroked with
the stick in synchronywith stroking viewed – via theHMD–on the
object. In the “asynchronous object”blocks the participants’ backs
FIGURE 1 | Setup Study 1. Participants stood at a distance of 2 m and with
their backs facing a video camera. Participants were either standing to the
right or the left of the midline. (A) Refers to the location of the participant,
(B) to the perceived location of the duplicated image of the participant,
(C) to the splitter that duplicates the video image, and (D) to the video camera
which is used to project the video image into the head-mounted display.
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were again stroked with the stick but a delay was added to the
visual display presented on the HMD so that the “felt stroking”
was asynchronous with respect to the seen stroking on the
object.
Procedure
The procedure was identical for all blocks except for those details
added below. Participants were instructed to keep their eyes open
and ﬁxate the cross in between the two bodies, as viewed via the
HMD (see Figure 1). In order to accurately assess self-location
during the four conditions, the procedure of the drift measure-
ment was practiced while wearing the HMD but before starting
the experiment. This was done to make sure that each partici-
pant was comfortable with blindfolded walking. At the end of
the block (of duration 2 min) self-location was measured once by
ﬁrst passively displacing the participants (the experimenter gently
guided the participants while they took very small steps back-
wards for approximately 1.5 m). They were then asked to walk
back to their initial position (while still blindfolded) with normal-
sized steps (as in Lenggenhager et al., 2007). The distance (the
“drift”) between the position held during the experimental block
and the position estimated by the participant was measured in
the anterior–posterior and left–right axis by hand with a mea-
surement tape. Self-identiﬁcation with the seen body and other
phenomenological aspects were assessed at the end of each block
by awrittenquestionnaire adapted fromLenggenhager et al. (2007;
see Table 1), where subjects had to rate each item on a seven-point
Likert scale (1 = “I don’t agree at all”; 7 = “I totally agree”). Addi-
tionally, after each block participants were asked if they identiﬁed
more with the right or the left body/object, or both equally. Partic-
ipants took a short break before the subsequent block if requested.
The order of blocks as well as the initial position (either to the right
or the left of the midline) were randomized and counterbalanced
across participants.
STUDY 2
Materials
Participants stood, always at the same location, in a large tracking
hall wearing markers on their hands, feet, head, and pelvis to track
their positions using 16 Vicon MX13 cameras. They wore a HMD
(nVisor SX60, 1280 × 1024 per eye, stereo, with 44 × 35 degree
ﬁeld of view) and viewed a stereoscopic computer generated image
of either two identical avatars (body condition) or two identical
objects (object condition) positioned 3 m in front of them. The
avatars or objects were scaled to match the width and height of the
participants. Graphics were presented in real-time with a latency
of 40 ms. Participants were instructed to remain still when stand-
ing, but if they moved the virtual characters’ limbs would also
move in accordance with the tracked limbs of the participants. In
the case of the object condition, if the participants moved slightly
the object location was also updated based on torso movement. In
the asynchronous condition, the movements of the avatars/objects
were also delayed. This was so that it corresponded exactly to
the previous experiment (study 1) using video HMD, and minor
movements of participants (e.g., swaying)were represented.White
noise was presented over headphones to mask any noise, and par-
ticipant’s vision of their surroundings was occluded by the HMD
setup (black felt within the nVisor HMD). The 3D-computer
generated environment had a constant artiﬁcial illumination (see
Figure 2). During “stroking blocks” the back (the area spanning
the shoulders to waist) of participants were irregularly stroked,
about twice per second by the experimenter with a long stick,
and participants viewed the stroking as rendered via the HMD.
The blocks lasted about 2 min. In asynchronous blocks a delay of
400 ms of the virtual stick’s tracking information was introduced
so that “seen stroking” and “felt stroking” did not correspond. For
the control condition we used a white upright rectangular human-
sized virtual object (object condition, see Figure 2). All stimulus
and procedural details were as described for the synchronous and
asynchronous blocks in the body condition, except that in “syn-
chronous object” blocks, participants’ backs were stroked with the
stick in synchrony with stroking viewed – via the HMD – on the
object. In the “asynchronous object” blocks the participants’ back
was again stroked with the stick but a delay was added to the
visual display presented on the HMD so that the “felt stroking”
was asynchronous with respect to the seen stroking on the object.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to study 1, with the exception that
in this experiment the participants saw either two computer
Table 1 | Questions for Studies 1 and 2.
Questions for Study 1 and Study 2
(1) It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the stick in the location where I saw the two virtual bodies/objects touched.
(2) It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the stick touching the two virtual bodies/objects.
(3) I felt as if the two virtual bodies/objects were my body.
(4) It felt as if my (real) body was drifting forwards (towards the two virtual bodies/objects).
(5) It seemed as if I might have more than one body.
(6) It seemed as if the touch I was feeling came from somewhere between my own body and the two virtual bodies/objects.
(7) It appeared (visually) as if the two virtual bodies /objects were drifting backwards (towards my body).
(8) Did you identify with …(1) The right virtual body/object more; (2) The left virtual body/object more; (3) Both virtual bodies/objects equally
Additional Question for Study 2 only: if answered 3 to question 8
(9) Did you identify with the two avatars/objects …(1) At the same time; (2) At different times
*(Virtual bodies (study 1)/avatars (study 2) or objects was used in all questions depending on condition)
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FIGURE 2 | Setup and visual stimulus Study 2. (A). Experimenter stroking
a participant who is wearing an HMD, and tracking objects for feet, hands,
and torso. The subject of the photograph has given written informed consent
to publication of their photograph. (B) Visual stimulus projected in stereo in
the HMD for the body condition. (C) Visual stimulus projected in stereo in the
HMD for the object condition.
generated characters (matched gender) or two computer gener-
ated blocks. The procedure was identical for all blocks except for
those details added below. Participants were instructed to keep
their eyes open and ﬁxate the cross in between the two bodies, as
viewed via the HMD (see Figure 2).
For the drift measure, a training phase allowed participants
to practice the blind walking before the experiment began. They
practiced ﬁrst without the HMD, then with the HMD using a top-
down camera to show them where they were in relation to their
original starting point. During the study, participants were stroked
for 2 min, then their displays went blank, and self-location was
measured as in study 1. All the motion tracking data were recorded
to disk, so the trajectories and distances walked by participants
were available for analysis. The drift was measured in the anterior–
posterior and the left–right axis. As in study 1, the participants
were not given feedback about their performance and instead were
blindly moved around a 3 m × 3 m area to be returned to their
physical starting location for the next trial.
The questionnaires (see Table 1) appeared one at a time on the
HMD displays, and participants were given a Nintendo Wiimote
to select their answers on a continuous scale between 1 ( =“I don’t
agree at all”) and 7 ( = “I totally agree”) with scores accurate to
two decimal places. Thus, they did not need to remove the HMD
between conditions (unlike Study 1 where a written questionnaire
was used). For study 2, an additional question concerning the
temporal aspects of the identiﬁcation with the avatar/objects was
asked. If they answered that they identiﬁed with both avatars
equally (Question 8: “Did you identify with the right, the left
or both virtual bodies/object equally”), they were asked an addi-
tional question: did you identify with both avatars at the same
time, or at different times? (see question 9, Table 1). Partici-
pants took a short break before the subsequent block if requested.
The order of blocks were randomized and counterbalanced across
participants.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical analyses within each study were conducted as fol-
lows. The drift (self-location) measure (anterior–posterior drift
and left–right drift calculated relative to initial position) was
analyzed using multilevel linear mixed effects models with within-
subjects factors body (body/object) and synchrony of stroking
(synchronous/asynchronous) as randomeffects nestedwithin sub-
jects (Field et al., 2012). The questionnaire scores were (a) not
normally distributed (Shapiro–Wilk test on model residuals) and
(b) of ordinal structure, and so we analyzed the questionnaire
data using the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with planned compar-
isons between the following conditions: BS vs. body asynchronous
(BA), object synchronous (OS) vs. object asynchronous (OA), and
BS vs. OS, and BA vs. OA. The signiﬁcance level used was 0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons using the Holm–Bonferroni
method.
The responses to question 8 (“Did you identify with the right
body more, the left body more or with both bodies equally?”)
were considered spatially, with left body more < both bodies
equally < right body more, hence the responses were on an ordinal
scale.We tested for an effect of body and synchrony on participants’
responses using proportional-odds logistic regression (McCullagh
and Nelder, 1989; Venables and Ripley, 2002).
An in-depth between-groups statistical analysis proceeds the
results of each study. This provides a statistical comparison
between the video-based (study 1) and 3D computer generated
(study 2) VR techniques.
RESULTS
STUDY 1
We found that self-identiﬁcation with the two virtual bodies and
objects depended on synchrony. This was associated with the sen-
sation of having more than one body, which was strongest in the
body synchronous condition. Self-location,measured by themean
drift towards the virtual bodies, was only signiﬁcantly modulated
in the BS condition.
Questionnaire
Aspredicted, self-identiﬁcationwith the virtual bodies (question3;
“I felt as if the virtual body/object wasmy body”)was highest in the
BS condition and lowest in the OA condition (see Figure 3). Self-
identiﬁcationwas rated signiﬁcantly higher in the BS (median= 6)
www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 946 | 5
“fpsyg-04-00946” — 2013/12/16 — 15:56 — page 6 — #6
Heydrich et al. Experience of having two bodies
FIGURE 3 | Questionnaire results for Study 1. This ﬁgure shows the
median scores of the responses relating to touch (questions 1 and 2),
self-identiﬁcation (question 3), the sensation of having more than one body
(question 5), as well as question 4, 6, and 7. Bold line indicates the median,
upper and lower limit of the box plot indicate the upper and lower quartile
(=75th and 25th percentile). Asterisks indicate a signiﬁcant difference.
BS = body synchronous, BA = body asynchronous, OS = object
synchronous, OA = object asynchronous.
than in the BA (median = 4; p = 0.048). We also found that self-
identiﬁcation was higher in the OS (median = 5) than the OA
condition (median = 3; p = 0.026). No signiﬁcant difference was
found between the BS and OS and BA and OA for question 3
(p > 0.14).
We found that the sensation of having more than one body
(question 5) depended on synchrony and on whether a body or
an object was shown: double body ownership was rated higher for
the BS (median = 3) than for BA (median = 3, p = 0.01) and OS
(median = 2) higher than OA (median = 1, p = 0.03). Moreover,
the BS condition was rated higher than the OS (p = 0.02) and
BA was rated higher than OA (p = 0.02, all p values corrected for
multiple comparisons using the Holm–Bonferroni method).
Moreover, statistical analysis revealed signiﬁcant differences
between the four conditions for questions 1 and 2. Participants
gave a signiﬁcantly higher positive rating in the BS condition (BS,
median = 7) compared to the BA (median = 3) condition for
question 1 (“It seemed as if I was feeling the touch of the stick in
the location where I saw the virtual body/object being touched”;
p = 0.01) and for the OS (median = 6) compared to the OA
(median = 4), respectively (p = 0.03). No signiﬁcant difference
was found between BS and OS and BA and OA, respectively (all
p > 0.6). As for question 2 (“It seemed as though the touch I felt
was caused by the stick touching the virtual body/object”) partici-
pants rated the BS condition signiﬁcantly higher (median = 6)
than the BA condition (median = 2; p = 0.035) and the
OS signiﬁcantly higher (median = 5) than OA (median = 3,
p = 0.025).
In Question 8, 57% of the participants indicated that they
identiﬁed with both virtual bodies equally (see Figure 6). The
responses were considered spatially on an ordinal scale, such that
left < both < right. There was a signiﬁcant effect of synchrony,
χ2(1) = 5.90, p = 0.015, such that participants’ responses were
biased to the right in the synchronous conditions. The effect of
body and the interaction effect were not signiﬁcant (p > 0.77).
Self-location
In the BS condition the participants showed a mean anterior–
posterior drift in self-location of 11.7 cm towards the virtual
bodies, whereas in the BA condition the mean drift was only
1.3 cm. In the OS conditions the participants showed a mean
drift of -0.1 cm and in the OA a mean drift of 5.8 cm towards the
objects (Figure 4).
The statistical analysis of the mean drift measure revealed a
signiﬁcant interaction between body and synchrony,χ2(1) = 5.23,
p = 0.022, with no signiﬁcant main effects (all p > 0.3). Separate
analyses were conducted for each level of synchrony to explain the
interaction effect. The analysis revealed a main effect of body was
present in the synchronous conditions, χ2(1) = 5.60, p = 0.018
(more drift towards bodies compared to objects) but this was not
signiﬁcant in the asynchronous conditions. The left–right drift
was not signiﬁcantly modulated by experimental condition.
STUDY 2
We found that self-identiﬁcation depended on synchrony, irre-
spective of whether two virtual bodies or two virtual objects
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FIGURE 4 | Drift results for Study 1 and Study 2. This ﬁgure shows
the mean drift for BS, BA, OS, and OA for study 1 and study 2. Error
bars represent one standard error of the mean. Asterisks indicate a
signiﬁcant difference based on pairwise comparisons. Note: the overall
analysis showed a signiﬁcant interaction between body and synchrony
for study 1. The main effects and interaction effect were not signiﬁcant
for study 2, and the pairwise comparison was referred to in the
discussion.
were presented. The sensation of having multiple bodies and
self-location was not signiﬁcantly modulated by the experimental
conditions.
Questionnaire
A similar pattern concerning illusory self-identiﬁcation (question
3) was found in study 2. Self-identiﬁcation was rated signiﬁ-
cantly higher in the BS condition (median = 5.15) than in the
BA (median = 2.10; p = 0.01, see Figure 5). Again, we found
that self-identiﬁcation was higher in the OS (median = 2.90)
than the OA condition (median = 2.08; p = 0.009). No signif-
icant difference could be found between BS and OS (p = 0.06)
and BA and OA (p = 0.69, all p values corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons using the Holm–Bonferroni method). In
contrast to study 1, double body ownership (question 5) was
not signiﬁcantly modulated by the experimental conditions
(p > 0.05).
The analysis of questionnaire results for study 2 further revealed
signiﬁcant differences between the four conditions for questions
1 and 2. Participants gave a signiﬁcantly higher positive rat-
ing in the BS (median = 6.48) compared to the BA condition
(median = 4.02) for question 1 (p = 0.004). Participants also
rated the OS (median = 5.71) higher than the OA (median = 4.38;
p = 0.009) for question 1. BS was rated signiﬁcantly higher than
OS (p = 0.01). No signiﬁcant difference was found between BA
and OA (p = 0.92).
For question 2 participants rated the BS (median = 5.24)
signiﬁcantly higher than the BA condition (median = 2.24;
p = 0.02) and the OS (median = 5.24) signiﬁcantly higher than
OA condition (median = 3.09; p = 0.021). No signiﬁcant differ-
ence was found between BS and OS (p = 0.47), and between BA
and OA (p = 0.72).
In Question 8, 54% of the participants indicated that they
identiﬁed with both avatars/objects equally (see Figure 6). The
analysis of the responses showed neither signiﬁcant effects of body
and synchrony nor a signiﬁcant interaction effect (all p > 0.31).
Importantly, of those who responded that they identiﬁed with
both avatars equally, 75.6% reported that they identiﬁed with the
avatars at the same time (Question 9). This was true irrespective
of experimental condition, χ2(3) = 1.69, p = 0.64.
Self-location
In the BS condition the participants showed a mean anterior–
posterior drift in self-location of 9.9 cm towards the virtual bodies,
whereas in the BA condition the mean drift was 10.8 cm. In the
OS conditions the participants showed a mean drift of 4.1 cm
towards the objects and in the OA a mean drift of 8.9 cm towards
the objects (see Figure 4).
The statistical analysis of the mean drift revealed no signiﬁ-
cant main effects of body [χ2(1) = 2.82, p = 0.093], synchrony
[χ2(1) = 1.62, p = 0.20], nor an interaction [χ2(1) = 0.72,
p = 0.40]. No signiﬁcant left–right drift was found.
BETWEEN-GROUPS COMPARISON
We conducted a between-groups statistical analysis to compare
the results of the video-based VR technique (study 1) and the
3D computer generated VR (study 2). Our analysis had there-
fore three factors: study, body (bodies vs. objects) and synchrony
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FIGURE 5 | Questionnaire results for Study 2. This ﬁgure shows the
median scores of responses relating to touch (questions 1 and 2),
self-identiﬁcation (question 3), the sensation of having more than one body
(question 5), as well as question 4, 6, and 7. Bold line indicates the median,
upper and lower limit of the box plot indicate the upper and lower quartile
(=75th and 25th percentile). Asterisks indicate a signiﬁcant difference.
BS = body synchronous, BA = body asynchronous, OS = object
synchronous, OA = object asynchronous.
FIGURE 6 | Question 8 results for Study 1 and Study 2. This ﬁgure shows the frequency counts for the response categories left, both, and right for
question 8.
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Table 2 | Principal component analysis.
Item Description Illusory touch Illusory drift Illusory touch
structure
Illusory drift
structure
h2
2 …The touch I felt was caused by the stick touching the
two virtual bodies/objects.
0.93 0.89 0.81
3 I felt as if the two virtual bodies/objects were my body. 0.86 0.87 0.30 0.76
1 …Feeling the touch of the stick in the location where I
saw the two virtual bodies/objects touched.
0.69 0.72 0.32 0.53
6 …The touch I was feeling came from somewhere
between my own body and the two virtual bodies/objects.
0.51 0.58 0.36 0.37
5 It seemed as if I might have more than one body. 0.49 0.46 0.63 0.61 0.59
7 It appeared (visually) as if the two virtual bodies/objects
were drifting backwards…
0.98 0.93 0.89
4 It felt as if my (real) body was drifting forwards (towards
the two virtual bodies/objects).
0.81 0.51 0.89 0.85
Items are sorted by their factor loadings from the third and fourth columns, which are taken from the pattern matrix.The ﬁfth and sixth columns are the factor loadings
from the structure matrix. Loadings <0.3 are not shown, and >0.4 are highlighted bold. h2 Represents the communalities.
(synchronous vs. asynchronous). Study was a between-subjects
factor and body and synchrony were within-subjects.
Questionnaire
Weconducted a principal components analysis (PCA) on the ques-
tionnaire results for questions 1–7 from both studies to identify
the underlying components. We compare the results of question 8
separately, because it had responses on a different scale (responses
were right, left or both).
For questions 1–7, data from both studies were taken into
account (independent samples) and a preliminary analysis was
carried out by running a PCA for each within-subject condition
separately, to see if the structurewas similar across conditions. Fol-
lowing this we report a complete PCA for the mean data from each
participant across conditions to extract a single structure used to
calculate factor scores. We then analyze the effect of study, body,
and synchrony.
Preliminary Analysis
The PCAs were carried out using the psych package in R (R Core
Team, 2013; Revelle, 2013). Bartlett’s test was signiﬁcant in each
within-subjects condition indicating that the correlation matrices
differed froman identitymatrix. TheKaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO)
measure ranged from mediocre to middling (Kaiser, 1974) and
were 0.66 (BS), 0.72 (BA), 0.68 (OS), and 0.66 (OA). The number
of factors to extract was based on Kaiser’s criterion of choosing
eigenvalues>1 (Kaiser, 1960), and conﬁrmed using the scree plot.
Rotation was oblique (oblimin) on theoretical grounds that the
underlying factors may be related.
In general conditions yielded two factors, with questions relat-
ing to illusory touch, and questions related to illusory drift. The
categories come from the questions themselves which primar-
ily ask the participant about the touch of the stick (questions
1, 2, and 6), and drifting forwards or backwards (questions
4 and 7). The exceptions were questions 3 and 5 which
asked whether the participants felt as if the two virtual bod-
ies/objects were their body (question 3), or whether they felt
they had more than one body (question 5). It was interest-
ing therefore to see whether these key questions corresponded
closely with touch or drift. Questions were considered primar-
ily related to one factor when their standardized loading was
> 0.3 for that factor and ≤ 0.3 for the other. This was typi-
cally the case for all questions except number 5 (more than one
body).
In the BS condition, Questions 1, 2, and 6 were related to
illusory touch (see Table 1) and loaded heavily on this factor, with
standardized loadings 0.67, 0.86, 0.57 respectively. Question 3
(self-identiﬁcation)was also in this category (standardized loading
0.84). Questions 7 and 4 were related to illusory drift (Table 1) and
loaded on this factor at 0.86 and 0.85. The remaining question,
number 5 (more than one body) loaded on both factors, at 0.31
and 0.65.
Results and factor loadings were similar in the OS condition,
with questions dividing into illusory touch and drift and question
5 loading on both factors at 0.39 and 0.45. The BA condition was
similar but with question 5 loading entirely on touch. OA on the
other hand had the most differing structure. For OA three factors
were extracted (due to eigenvalues >1 and the scree plot) and we
identiﬁed these as drift (questions 7 and 4), touch-identiﬁcation
(primarily questions 2 and question 3), and touch-location (ques-
tions 1 and 6). Question 5 loaded on touch-identiﬁcation at 0.72
and<0.3 on the others.
In summary the questionnaire structure was similar with two
factors for conditions BS,BA, andOS. The self-identiﬁcation ques-
tion 3 related to touch and question 5 (more than one body) related
to both factors in the synchronous conditions. Note that the differ-
ing structure arose in the objects/asynchronous control condition
only.
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Effect of Study, Body, and Synchrony on Questionnaire Responses
We carried out a PCA to look at the overall structure of the
questionnaire, taking the mean results for each participant across
conditions (an approach similar to Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012).
This showed the underlying factors in the overall questionnaire
responses.
Bartlett’s test was signiﬁcant indicating the correlation matrix
differed from an identity matrix, p = 2×10−14. The KMO was
0.70 (middling), and the determinant was ﬁne, 0.03. Two factors
were extracted, based on Kaiser’s criterion and the scree plot, and
these were again illusory touch (questions 1, 2, 6) and illusory drift
(questions 4 and 7). Interestingly, question 3 loaded highly on
touch (0.86) but low on drift (0.03). Question 5 related to touch
and drift fairly equally (0.49 and 0.46 respectively). The pattern
and structure matrices are shown in Table 2.
Questions 1, 3, and 6 had low loadings on the drift factor in the
pattern matrix and increased (>0.3) loadings on the drift factor
in the structure matrix. Question 4 showed increased loading on
the touch factor in the structure matrix, but still loaded mostly on
drift. The changes from the pattern to the structure matrix were
a result of the relationship between the two factors. However, this
relationship did not obscure the pattern of results: the question
items divided into the two underlying factors of illusory touch and
drift fairly consistently in the two matrices.
Factor scores for illusory touch and illusory drift were calcu-
lated for all participants in all conditions, from the structurematrix
using the regression method (Field et al., 2012). The scores take
into account the loading of each question onto each factor, and
the relationship between pairs of questions.
A multivariate analysis of variance using Pillai’s trace, with
experimental conditions study, body, and synchrony, showed a sig-
niﬁcant main effect of study on illusory touch and drift,V = 0.080,
F(2,135) = 5.85, p = 0.0037, in that illusory touch and drift were
both higher in study 1 (video-based) than study 2 (3D computer
generated). There was also a main effect of synchrony, V = 0.16,
F(2,135) = 12.96, p = 7.1 × 10−6, in that illusory touch and drift
were higher in the synchronous condition.
Individual analyses were conducted separately on dependent
variables touch and drift to understand whether the effects were
predominantly taking place on one variable only. Two linear
mixed-effects models were used (one for touch and the other
for drift) with study, body, and synchrony as factors, and the
latter two factors as nested random effects within subjects.
The results for touch revealed a signiﬁcant effect of synchrony,
χ2(1) = 51.86, p < 0.0001, such that touch was higher in the
synchronous conditions. An analysis on drift revealed a signif-
icant effect of body, χ2(1) = 4.78, p = 0.029, and synchrony,
χ2(1) = 7.39, p = 0.0065, such that drift was higher in the
body conditions compared to the objects and in the synchronous
conditions compared to the asynchronous. All other effects were
non-signiﬁcant.
In summary, the effect of study was found in the multivari-
ate analysis on the underlying questionnaire components touch
and drift, indicating signiﬁcantly stronger illusion responses from
study 1 compared to study 2. But the study effect was only found
when considering the twodependent variables together, suggesting
there was an overall effect on the illusion that was not detected in
a single component alone. The effect of synchrony was present in
both dependent variables, touch and drift. The effect of body was
found only in the follow-up analysis, on the illusory drift response.
The bodily appearance is therefore relevant to the illusory drift,
and this relates coherently to our ﬁndings from both studies using
the behavioral drift measure of self-location (Figure 4).
Self-Location
A linear mixed-effects model comparing the effect of study,
body (bodies vs. objects), and synchrony (synchronous vs. asyn-
chronous) on anterior–posterior drift, with body and synchrony as
random effects nested within subjects, showed a signiﬁcant inter-
action between body and synchrony, χ2(1) = 5.76, p = 0.016.
All other effects were non-signiﬁcant. The analysis proceeded by
looking at each level of synchrony separately, to understand the
interaction.
At the synchronous level there was a main effect of body,
χ2(1) = 9.40, p = 0.0022, such that we measured a self-location
drift further forwards in the body condition (mean = 10.85 cm)
compared to the object control (mean = 1.86 cm). At the asyn-
chronous level the effect of body was non-signiﬁcant. The effect of
body on anterior–posterior drift revealed itself in the synchronous
condition only.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of study on left–right drift,
χ2(1) = 6.39, p = 0.012, such that there was a bias to the right in
study 2 (3D computer generatedVR) mean = 6.06 cm to the right,
compared to study 1 (video-based VR), mean = −4.11 cm.
Identiﬁcation with Left, Right, or Both Bodies
Question 8 on the questionnaire was considered spatially as an
ordinal response, in that left < both < right. We analyzed the
responses as before using proportional-odds logistic regression
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). The experimental factors were
study, body, and synchrony. The data are plotted inFigure 6.We can
see the data in study 2 appear more centralized and so we adopt
this as our base study. This does not change the results of the
analysis but makes the coefﬁcients straightforward to interpret,
such that a positive coefﬁcient indicates a rightward bias com-
pared to the more centralized distribution. The analysis resulted
in a signiﬁcant main effect of study, χ2(1) = 13.05, p = 0.0003,
with a standardized coefﬁcient Z = 2.26. This indicated that there
were signiﬁcantly more rightward responses in study 1 (video-
based VR) compared to study 2 (3D computer generated VR).
The effects of experimental factors body and synchrony were not
signiﬁcant.
The results suggest there is anunderlying rightward bias present
in both studies that has revealed itself statistically in the between-
groups comparisons in study 1 in the questionnaire, and in study
2 in the self-location drift.
DISCUSSION
We report that self-identiﬁcation with two virtual bodies was
stronger during synchronous stroking as compared to asyn-
chronous stroking. This was accompanied by the sensation of
having more than one body and a change in self-location towards
the virtual bodies that was body-speciﬁc and depended on the
synchrony of stroking in study 1. We discuss (1) the implication
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of our ﬁndings for the study of bodily self-consciousness, (2) pos-
sible explanations for the differing results in study 1 and 2, and (3)
the implications for the use of two widely used VR techniques to
investigate visual capture illusions.
EXPERIENCE OF HAVING TWO BODIES
Using a modiﬁed version of the full body illusion paradigm in
which we presented two virtual bodies, we demonstrate that it is
possible to self-identify simultaneously with two virtual bodies.
This is in contrast to the classical setup, where participants are
exposed to a single second body (the virtual body) in addition
to their own physical body, but do not report having more than
one body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). The present data are a ﬁrst
step towards the investigation of double body ownership, e.g.,
to feel being touched on two visually presented bodies and to
identify with the two bodies simultaneously. Interestingly, in study
1, this was further associated with the subjective feeling of having
multiple bodies.
Similarly, the rubber hand illusion has been recently extended
to more than one fake hand: whereas in the classical rubber hand
illusion setup it has been argued that the feeling of illusory own-
ership is limited to the fake (seen) hand (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998), it has been shown that the use of two fake hands results in
the sensation of having an additional hand (Newport et al., 2010),
as can be observed in patients suffering from a supernumerary
phantom limb of neurological origin (Khateb et al., 2009). Fur-
thermore,Guterstamet al. (2011) showed that healthy participants
experience a second additional right hand (“supernumerary limb
illusion”) if the real hand was visible during the rubber hand illu-
sion. Questionnaire and skin conductance response data (SCR)
provided further evidence that ownership was equal for the real
and the fake hand, in contrast to the signiﬁcant disownership
for the real hand which accompanies the traditional rubber hand
illusion (Moseley et al., 2008). The authors suggest that this is
achieved through multisensory integration processes in premotor
and parietal cortices representing two equally probable locations
for the seen somatosensory stimulation and therefore identifying
with the two hands at the same time. One might argue that our
ﬁndings could be interpreted in a similar way. However, there
are some important differences between the present setup and
the one used by Guterstam and colleagues. First, while being
exposed to two virtual bodies through the HMD, the physical
body was not directly visually perceived during our experiment.
We argue that the visual presentation of two virtual bodies is
necessary to induce “double” body ownership, as earlier work
using the traditional full body illusion (with one virtual body)
did not induce the sensation of having two bodies (Lenggen-
hager et al., 2007). Therefore, our study is closely related with the
experimental setup of Ehrsson (2009) investigating the “supernu-
merary limb illusion,” where also two fake hands are presented
while the physical hand is covered. We speculate that the expe-
rience of self-identiﬁcation with both virtual bodies is due to
the extension of the large and often bilateral receptive ﬁelds in
bimodal visuo-tactile neurons in the parietal cortex to include
both virtual bodies (i.e., Duhamel et al., 1998; Blanke, 2012).
Such bimodal visuo-tactile neurons have been shown to integrate
visual stimuli in peripersonal space and tactile stimuli applied
to the upper body and face. Secondly, there is an important
difference between the sensation of a supernumerary body part
and the sensation of double body ownership: while one can
experience having an additional limb, the singularity of self-
awareness might still be conserved, e.g., there remains a singular
self that seems to have a total of three limbs during the illusory
state.
The identiﬁcation with more than one body and the sensation
of having more than one body, as observed in study 1 and not
conﬁrmed in study 2, should, however, be regarded as a prelim-
inary experimental step towards understanding the mechanisms
involved in the experience of the singular self and its loss. We
note that double body ownership has been reported clinically in
cases of heautoscopy for several decades (Brugger, 2002; Blanke
et al., 2004; Heydrich and Blanke, 2013). The present experiment
failed to evoke behavioral measures of such strong duplications
of the self as behavioral drift in self-location towards the vir-
tual bodies (in study 1) was similar to the effect of viewing a
single body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Ionta et al., 2011). More
work, likely using additional interoceptive manipulations (i.e.,
Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013), may be necessary to achieve
stronger distortions of the self, associated with double body own-
ership as in heautoscopy (Brugger, 2002; Heydrich and Blanke,
2013). Although we argue that the drift measure reﬂects the
position in space (self-location) where the subjects felt that they
were standing during the illusion and note that it has been repli-
cated across several studies (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell et al.,
2009) and using different techniques (e.g., mental imagery, Ionta
et al., 2011), the drift measure by itself is not an objective mea-
sure for double body ownership. However, future research will
have to address the question of how viewing two bodies affects
changes in self-location, also in the right–left axis, more systemat-
ically, e.g., by stroking one body synchronously while stroking the
other body asynchronously, or by using eye-tracking to observe
whether participants’ attention could be biased towards one
body.
There are also several differences and limitations in our ﬁndings
if compared with those obtained in previous experiments using
the full body illusion. First, in contrast to the ﬁndings of Lenggen-
hager et al. (2007), modulation of illusory self-identiﬁcation by
synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in the present study was
not limited to the body condition; thus participants reported
that they also self-identiﬁed with the two objects (question 3).
This is in line with ﬁndings from Armel and Ramachandran
(2003), who showed that participants showed increased SCR
and ownership ratings when the “RHI” was performed with a
table. This occurred when the table was stimulated synchronously
with the subject’s hand, and in absence of a fake hand. We
note that, since participants in our studies were required to ﬁx-
ate on a cross between the two bodies (or two objects), this
might have also reduced the body speciﬁcity of the illusions
(e.g., self-identiﬁcation) as reported previously (Lenggenhager
et al., 2007). In line with this argument is the observation that
in a recent experiment by Aspell et al. (2009) using the full
body illusion and the CCE, the speciﬁcity of the full body illu-
sion as measured by questionnaires was also not limited to the
virtual body, e.g., synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation also
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modulated self-identiﬁcation with an object. It could be argued
that the CCE, an attention demanding discrimination task (i.e.,
a dual task next to the full body illusion), may reduce the body-
speciﬁcity often observed in the absence of such dual tasks. As
neither Ehrsson (2009), Guterstam et al. (2011), norNewport et al.
(2010) reported an object control condition or another attention
demanding task during their experiments with an extra hand, it
is not known whether self-identiﬁcation for the two objects in the
present experiment was due to experimental differences or due
to the fact that in our studies two bodies/objects were presented
simultaneously.
The overall ﬁndings from study 1 were replicated to some
extent in our second study, using 3D computer generated graph-
ics. Self-identiﬁcation with the two virtual bodies was positively
modulated by visuo-tactile synchrony, irrespective of whether
two bodies or two objects were presented (question 3). Like-
wise, illusory touch and illusory causation (questions 1 and 2)
were induced by visuo-tactile synchrony. Importantly, we found
that participants identify with the two bodies at the same time,
e.g., we speciﬁcally asked participants in study 2 if they identiﬁed
with the two virtual bodies simultaneously or in an alternating
fashion, and 76% of responses indicated that this double self-
identiﬁcation was happening simultaneously. However, we found
that in the 3D computer generated setup participants showed a
forward drift in self-location (towards both the avatars/objects)
regardless of whether visuo-tactile stimulus was synchronous or
not. Also, no sensation of having multiple bodies was reported in
study 2.
Statistically, there were signiﬁcantly stronger results on the
underlying components of the questionnaire, namely illusory
touch and illusory drift, in study 1 compared to study 2. The effect
of body was in particular important to illusory drift. This was con-
sistent with the ﬁndings from the overall behavioral drift: an effect
of body was found on the behavioral drift in the synchronous con-
ditions. Thebetween-groups comparison also revealed a rightward
bias present in both studies, that was observed in the questionnaire
results (study 1) and in the behavioral drift measure (study 2), so
in this sense the overall left–right drift results were similar in both
studies.
The partial discrepancy between the results of study 1 and study
2 leads to the secondpart of the discussion, namely the comparison
between the twoVR techniques, whichmight explain the diverging
results of study 1 and 2.
COMPARISON BETWEEN VIRTUAL REALITY TECHNIQUES
The two studies used video and computer generated HMD virtual
environments respectively, with the second study using motion
tracking and 3D computer generated graphics to render the virtual
bodies and stick.
In the following we would like to discuss several issues that may
be of relevance when using VR techniques to study bodily self-
consciousness, namely distance estimation, visual ﬁdelity, latency,
visual realism, and the self-location measure.
Distance estimation has been shown to be veridical with real-
world expectations in carefully calibrated video HMD setups,
but underestimated in computer generated HMDs (Swan Ii et al.,
2006). An underestimation could have caused a change in our
self-location measure. We note, however, that in this case self-
location results should have been inﬂuenced globally across all
conditions. In addition, both Mohler et al. (2010) and Ries et al.
(2009) have demonstrated that seeing a virtual avatar in HMDs for
a short time leads to no underestimation of distances in computer
generated HMDs. For these reasons we do not think that distance
underestimation played a role in our experimental results, or the
differences between the results in study 1 and 2
Further differences between study 1 and study 2 were visual
ﬁdelity, visual realism and latency. Here, visual ﬁdelity refers to
whether the virtual body resembles the body of the participant.
The virtual bodies in study 1 were video images of the participants,
and in contrast study 2 used generic 3D avatars.
Although it seems that in study 2 no high visual ﬁdelity was
needed to identify with a virtual body or to some extent even
with an object (question 3), it has been shown that top–down
processes such as visual identity might inﬂuence the rubber hand
illusion (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) and the full body illusion or
related paradigms. This could explain the fact that we did not ﬁnd
a change in self-location and no illusory experience of ownership
of more than one body in study 2.
Numerous object controls in previous studies have emphasized
the relationship between appearance and illusory response, e.g.,
Lenggenhager et al. (2007) did not detect drift with an object con-
trol, and Petkova and Ehrrson (2008) found that greater visual
ﬁdelitymattered for theirmeasure of skin conductivity in response
to a visual threat, when they compared a human mannequin to an
object control. Taking our results in the context of related work
suggests that ﬁdelity ismore important for certainmeasures. From
our results, those measures are self-location drift (consistent with
Lenggenhager et al., 2007) and the subjective sensation of having
more than one body, where the effects were only detected using
the high ﬁdelity visual bodies from study 1.
Object control conditions reinforce the principle that the
objects to be embodied must look human-like. However, our
results raise the questionof whether there is aﬁdelity scale, inwhich
higher ﬁdelity objects produce stronger illusions of identiﬁcation
and ownership. Tsakiris et al. investigated this for the RHI with
a range of hand-like objects from low (block) to medium (hand
shape) to high ﬁdelity (rubber hand). In general the principle was
shown to hold, where increasing ﬁdelity appeared to increase the
illusion for a variety of measures. Interestingly, consistent with
our ﬁndings, the effect of drift was particularly sensitive, and only
the highest ﬁdelity synchronous condition showed signiﬁcant drift
from the baseline measure (Tsakiris et al., 2010). Similarly, while
participants reported ownership over two hand images in a study
by Newport et al. (2010) this did not transfer to a motor response
task. Thus, when visual ﬁdelity is higher (study 1), we see a positive
drift towards the virtual bodies and a signiﬁcant effect of double
body ownership in the body-synchronous condition (question 5),
compared to the body-asynchronous control. However, it remains
speculative why self-location and double body ownership (ques-
tion 5) are more sensitive to visual ﬁdelity as compared to illusory
touch (question 1 and 2) and self-identiﬁcation (question 3). For
self-location, this may be because the effect can dissociate from
self-identiﬁcation, as suggested by Rohde et al. (2011) in the RHI.
Their results for the RHI show that drift can be driven with vision
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only, results which in our context would predict the importance of
visual ﬁdelity to the drift measure. They found that drift can also
occur in the asynchronous condition even when self-identiﬁcation
is low, i.e., the results we obtained in the body condition in
study 2, which we discuss further below with regards to latency.
Regarding double body ownership (question 5), further stud-
ies are needed to investigate the relationship with visual ﬁdelity
by directly comparing different visual renderings with the same
methodology.
Another aspect of the computer generated setup is visual
realism. Although full-body and body part illusions have been per-
formed in other VR setups without high visual ﬁdelity, there were
still many differences between our study and previous implemen-
tations. For example, the plain background in study 2 is in stark
contrast to the visual realism in a study from Slater et al. (2010),
who created visual capture with a virtual environment consisting
of a detailed scene, complete with ﬁreplace, television, sound, vir-
tual mirror, and interaction, i.e., when participants moved their
head they could look around, which was not the case in the studies
presented here. Any one of the additional details could be used
by computer generated VR to increase visual capture, presence,
and other factors. Thus, it may be necessary to add more details
to the computer-generated environment to elevate the illusion
quality and strength to those obtained with video (or to create
an equal illusion of presence to that achieved by video). How-
ever, understanding the importance of each component in the VR
setup, e.g., sound, 3D model, interaction, would require future,
more systematic, work. The work would build on the ﬁndings
here, suggesting that the similar experimental conditions using
two differentVR technologies show stronger results in video-based
VR.
The ﬁnal major difference between our two studies was latency.
Although the delay between the stick physically touching the body
and the visual stick touching the virtual body was only approxi-
mately 25 ms longer in study 2 than study 1, this increased latency
could have reduced the difference between the synchronous and
asynchronous conditions. Importantly, according to a recent
review on intersensory synchrony, delays of >20 ms do become
noticeable (Vroomen and Keetels, 2010). Rohde et al. (2011)
showed a positive drift can be also found during the asynchronous
condition in the RHI, i.e., changes in perceived hand position still
occurred with asynchronous stroking. If we analyze, for example,
the self-location measure in study 2 without the asynchronous
conditions and compare the BS to the OS condition, then we do
in fact ﬁnd a signiﬁcant drift towards the virtual bodies in the
body condition as compared to the object condition [t(16) = 2.37,
p = 0.03]. This would support the hypothesis that a synchrony-
dependant change in self-location was not found in study 2 due to
a weaker contrast between synchronous and asynchronous con-
ditions and that mostly a difference between the body and the
object condition was observed. A solution to this weaker con-
trast in study 2 would be to create a more delayed asynchronous
condition, or alternatively to use a more sensitive measure of
self-location. Already Lenggenhager et al. (2007) have speculated
on the importance of their asynchronous control condition, and
their ﬁrst experiment did not use a delay in the asynchronous
condition, but a pre-recorded video, which they note would
be perceived as even more asynchronous and less predictable,
thus creating a stronger contrast between synchronous and asyn-
chronous experimental conditions. Similarly, Sanchez-Vives et al.
(2010) used pre-recorded animation in their asynchronous con-
dition, in a computer graphics version of the RHI. In addition,
more robust behavioral measure of self-location might be needed,
such as the CCE (Aspell et al., 2009), distance estimation measures
(Ionta et al., 2011; Pfeiffer et al., 2013), or motor imagery (Ionta
et al., 2012) as these are based on repeated reaction time measures
(Aspell et al., 2009).
Additionally,we suggest that the illusionmaybeharder todetect
with two bodies. Related work with lower ﬁdelity setups or similar
VR setups with equivalent latency used one body or part of the
body. A combination of higher ﬁdelity, higher realism, and lower
latency may be demanded in the case of study 2 to detect the effect
of self-location with more than one virtual body.
Finally, we note that a within-subject design would have given
more statistical power in a comparison between the two techniques
used. Unfortunately this was not possible, given that the technique
for study 1 was only available in Lausanne and the technique for
study 2 only in Tübingen. Although we tried to replicate the setup
as close as possible, the above outlined comparison of the two
techniques is therefore based on a between-subject design and
some statistically signiﬁcant differences may have been missed.
CONCLUSION
We conclude from these experiments that participants can iden-
tify with two virtual bodies (study 1 and 2), if synchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation is applied. Moreover, they can experi-
ence the sensation of having more than one body (as is evidenced
in Study 1) and identify with the two bodies at the same time (as
is reported in Study 2). In addition, changes in self-identiﬁcation
in study 1 are to some extent supported by a body-selective and
stroking dependant drift in self-location towards the virtual bod-
ies, although no objective measure of double body ownership
was obtained. Comparing the results across studies showed sig-
niﬁcantly stronger responses in study 1 on the two underlying
components of the questionnaire, illusory touch and illusory drift,
indicating a stronger subjective illusion in the video-based VR.
These data show a ﬁrst step towards studying double body own-
ership experimentally, using paradigms from the ﬁeld of bodily
self-consciousness.
Finally, we suggest that the differences we found between video
VR and 3D computer generated VR should be considered in fur-
ther investigations. Computer generated techniques are useful
in that many potentially interesting factors, i.e., identity, visual
motor synchrony, and the number of virtual bodies are easy to
implement and manipulate in a controlled manner. However, the
visual realism of the computer generated environment needs to
be rich enough to create a sense of presence in the virtual space.
Speciﬁcally, our results suggest that visual ﬁdelity is important for
experiencing more than one body. Additionally, we propose that a
strong contrast between the timing in the experimental and con-
trol conditions, as well as a more sensitive measure of self-location
might be needed in order to use computer generatedVR in place of
video HMD technology to investigate visual capture and to study
illusory body ownership of more than one body.
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